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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of the hospital regulatory system in the state of 
Maryland.  The system has been highly successful in lowering the gross charge-to-cost 
ratios that hospitals charge to their patients.  In many states, these charge markups appear 
to be exorbitantly high, which is a great concern since the cost of health care is becoming 
more and more expensive for Americans.  This thesis will include a description of the 
regulatory agency in Maryland, an explanation of how it works, and how it affects the 
Maryland hospital sector.  Econometric analysis will then be employed in order to 
determine whether or not the regulatory system successfully helps hospitals reduce costs, 
a high priority objective of the system.  In this model, Maryland hospital costs will be 
compared with nearby hospitals in Virginia.  The paper will conclude with an evaluation 
of the merits of the system, and a recommendation on whether or not it would be useful 
in other states. 
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I. Introduction: 
The development of an efficient and comprehensive health care system is near the 
top of the list of the nation’s socioeconomic problems.  There are many unique aspects of 
health care, and of the health care market that make the inefficiencies and limitations of 
the current system very difficult to correct.  The urgency of finding a way to improve the 
health care system is underscored by the fact that there are 45.8 million Americans 
without health insurance, and that although countless plans have been proposed to deal 
with this problem, an answer has not yet been discovered.   
The hospital market functions like a differentiated product oligopoly rather than a 
perfectly competitive market (Berry 1994).  It lacks the level of price transparency 
necessary to reap the benefits of competition. This lack of transparency, combined with 
the relative price inelasticity of demand for health care, provides hospitals with a high 
degree of price setting power.  As a consequence hospitals’ gross charge list prices are 
generally a great deal higher than the cost of the service provided.  Since the 
overwhelming bulk of hospital care is paid according to the fee schedules of Medicare 
and health insurance, gross charges directly affect only the uninsured.  Nevertheless there 
is a strong, positive correlation between gross charges and hospital profits (Institute for 
Health and Socio-economic Policy 2005).  As a launching point for negotiations of fee 
schedules, high gross charges contribute to higher reimbursements from insurance 
companies.  High markups make health insurance more and more expensive for 
Americans, and high and rising health insurance prices have led many companies to cut 
employee health benefits or reduce coverage.  In addition to these high gross charges and 
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the resulting high price levels, high rates of medical price inflation make it difficult for 
hospital managers to control cost.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, inflation 
for general medical and surgical hospitals (using the Producer Price Index) was 5.8%, 
4.9%, 3.8%, and 4.2% for the years from 2003 to 2006.  These rates were substantially in 
excess of the overall rate of inflation over these same years as measured by the Consumer 
Price Index.  Of course, a truly useful analysis of rising health care prices must consider 
economic efficiency as well as distributional equity.  Government intervention is one 
means for correcting the failure of market forces to control costs in the hospital sector.  
Many proposals for controlling hospital costs have been drafted, ranging from universal 
health care to hospital price regulation.   
The state of Maryland provides an interesting case study for the effectiveness of 
schemes for hospital price regulation.  Maryland has the most highly regulated hospital 
sector in the country.  Since the implementation of its hospital regulation plan, 
Maryland’s gross charges for hospital services have fallen from 25% above the national 
average to 6% below.  This provides strong prima facie evidence for believing that the 
Maryland Plan has been very successful in controlling prices of hospital services, at least 
in relation to the rest of the country, and it may provide a model for other states to 
consider. 
My purpose in this thesis is to analyze more closely than has yet been done, 
certain aspects of Maryland’s hospital regulation system.  I will begin by presenting a 
qualitative examination of the Maryland regulation system.  This will include an 
explanation of what the Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) of 
Maryland does; an explanation of the objectives of the Commission; and a description of 
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how it accomplishes these objectives.  I will then present my quantitative analysis of the 
likely impact of the Maryland system on total hospital operating costs.  My objective has 
been to construct an econometric model that will explain the structure of total hospital 
operating costs in 2005 (the choice of total operating costs as the dependent variable will 
be explained below.)  The cost structure of Virginia will be used as a point of comparison 
to identify the impact of the Maryland regulatory scheme.  Virginia was chosen for two 
reasons.  First, because of its geographical proximity to Maryland I believe it has 
important similarities to Maryland.  Second, because it does not employ a hospital price 
regulation system like that of Maryland it provides an example of a state against which 
Maryland can be measured.  The comparison will provide insight into whether or not 
Maryland’s HSCRC succeeds in minimizing hospital costs.  The comparison will provide 
a basis for judging whether or not the Maryland hospital regulation system is beneficial in 
aiding hospitals to hold down costs. 
 
II. Literature Review: 
 In a publication entitled “The Third Annual IHSP Hospital 200: The Nation’s 
Most – and Least – Expensive Hospitals Fiscal Year 2003/ 2004,”1 the Institute for 
Health and Socio-economic Policy2 used a survey of over 4,222 hospitals in order to 
analyze pricing structure and profits in the US hospital sector.  In particular, the study 
looks at the implication of different charge-to-cost markup ratios for hospitals and how 
these markups affect profits.  The first of these ratios is the markup for the hospital’s 
                                                 
1
 Institute for Health and Socio-economic Policy. “The Third Annual IHSP Hospital 200: The Nation’s 
Most – and Least – Expensive Hospitals Fiscal Year 2003/ 2004.” 2005. 
2
 The IHSP is a non-profit policy and research group based in California.  The group focuses on providing 
policy and economic analysis in health care and other industries. 
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operations as a whole, or the total charge to cost ratio, which is calculated by dividing 
“the total aggregated charges by the total aggregated costs associated with the hospital’s 
major financial categories/centers.”3  Additional calculations are made for the markups 
for individual goods and services such as drugs sold to patients or operating room 
services.  This is done by dividing the listed gross charges by the costs that can be 
directly expensed to individual good or service. 
The average total charge-to-cost ratio for the 4,222 hospitals in the study was 
244% for 2004, indicating that if total aggregated hospital services cost $10, the average 
hospital charge $24.40 for those services.  This was up from the previous year’s number 
of 232% in 2003.  The hundred most expensive hospitals in the country set aggregate 
gross charges at 680% of cost.  Certain individual goods and services in health care had 
much higher markups, namely operating rooms, drugs, and medical supplies.  The top 
forty most expensive hospitals for each charged exorbitant markups of 1,073% for 
operating rooms, 2,319% for drugs, and 5,090% for medical supplies, respectively.  The 
average for all 4,200 hospitals for drug markups was 425% in 2004 versus the 398% 
markup from the previous year, representing a 6.77% increase.  These three divisions of 
health care tend to be the profit centers for hospitals. 
The IHSP report also shows how different types of hospitals differ with respect to 
charge-to-cost ratios.  The most expensive hospitals are for-profit institutions with an 
average total charge-to-cost percentage of 366%.  The least expensive are government 
hospitals which averaged a 181% charge-to-cost ratio.  Of the hundred most expensive 
hospitals in the country, 64 were large, for-profit institutions, and 89 were system 
                                                 
3
 Institute for Health and Socio-economic Policy. “The Third Annual IHSP Hospital 200: The Nation’s 
Most – and Least – Expensive Hospitals Fiscal Year 2003/ 2004.” 2005. p.12. 
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affiliated hospitals.  (A system affiliated hospital is simply a hospital that is horizontally 
integrated with others.)  The high markup ratios of for-profit hospitals could indicate that 
regulation might be necessary to prevent these institutions from charging exorbitant 
prices.  Not-for-profit and government hospitals appear to behave differently in the way 
that they price their services.  This suggests that a regulatory system such as Maryland’s 
that closely monitors hospital pricing might be helpful in controlling exorbitant hospital 
charges elsewhere. 
Health care pricing does not directly affect most consumers in the same way that 
pricing does in other industries.  Though hospitals are required to charge the same price 
to everyone, different groups end up paying different prices for the same service.  The 
vast majority of hospital service reimbursement comes from Medicare, Medicaid, or 
health insurance companies.  Medicare and Medicaid reimburse hospitals based on a 
formula that utilizes a number of variables.  This reimbursement aims to be at or around 
the cost of the service provided.  Payments by insurance companies are based on 
prearranged fee schedules included in contractual agreements between insurers and 
hospitals.  The remainder of hospital income comes either from government subsidy or 
the uninsured.  The uninsured are the only group that is charged the aforementioned list 
prices. 
The interesting finding from the IHSP report is not necessarily the exorbitant 
markups charged by some hospitals, but the fact that there is a strong, positive correlation 
between high charge-to-cost markups and high profits.  The results from the IHSP survey 
indicate a general relationship that the higher the charge-to-cost ratio, the higher the net 
income for that hospital.  The IHSP report proposes that one reason for this relationship is 
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that the gross charges are used as a starting point for negotiations between hospitals and 
insurance companies.  Higher gross charges might play a role in edging up the 
reimbursements outlined in the fee schedules.  Of course, higher prices paid by insurance 
companies ultimately lead to higher prices for consumers since insurers will eventually 
have to implement higher deductibles and/ or raise premiums. 
The IHSP report also provides other support for the contention that government 
intervention is necessary in order to regulate hospitals.  For-profit hospitals appear to act 
differently than government and not-for-profit hospitals.  By charging what appear to be 
unnecessarily high prices, hospitals seem to be making health care more expensive for 
insurance companies and therefore consumers.  In addition, the uninsured often incur 
huge amounts of debt as a result of health care bills.  According to Access Project, a 
Boston based health care resource center, “half of all personal bankruptcies and one third 
of all credit card debt is caused by illness or medical bills.”4 
An alternative analysis of hospital pricing behavior is performed in “Competition 
Among Hospitals” by Martin Gaynor and William B. Vogt (2003).5 Gaynor and Vogt 
aim to examine and characterize the differences in behavior between for-profit and not-
for-profit hospitals.  In their study they used data from 593 California hospitals to 
estimate structural demand and pricing equations in order to analyze the pricing 
environment in the hospital sector. 
 The authors begin with a discussion of the nature of the hospital market and the 
ways in which it functions like a differentiated product oligopoly.  They enumerate some 
of the ways in which hospital products are differentiated.  One very important 
                                                 
4
 Lalasz, Elizabeth. “The US Health Care System: Sick and Getting Sicker.” Socialist Worker.  2007. 
5
 Gaynor, Martin and William B. Vogt. “Competition Among Hospitals”. RAND Journal of Economics. 
Winter 2003. 
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characteristic differentiating hospitals is how much consumers value proximity to the 
service offered.  Physical location clearly carries an enormous impact on the level of 
demand for a hospital’s services.  This provides some hospitals with a certain degree of 
price setting power.  The authors also note that hospitals are differentiated by factors like 
“religious affiliation… the breadth of the product line they offer, the technological 
sophistication of their services, the quality of the ‘hotel’ services they offer, their use and 
deployment of staffing, and their mortality rates.”6 
 Gaynor and Vogt also discuss the high volume of mergers in the hospital sector 
that has led to a great deal of consolidation of the market.  They cite one estimate that 
calculated 900 mergers of US hospitals between the years of 1994 and 2000.7  As a result, 
many insurance companies complain about rising prices in areas where consolidations 
have led to the existence of only two or three hospital chains.  With these issues in mind, 
the authors eventually simulate two hospital mergers in California and analyze the 
effects. 
The authors treat for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals slightly differently.  For-
profit hospitals are thought of as operating more or less like ordinary business firms by 
maximizing profit.  Not-for-profit hospitals are thought of as having varying missions 
therefore they operate differently.  In their study, not-for-profit hospitals are thought of as 
maximizing a utility function that depends on both profit and also the level of output.  
This makes intuitive sense because these hospitals will obviously aim to bring in income, 
but they also aim to maximize the service they provide for their community.  This sort of 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. p. 2 
7
 Jaklevic, M. “Tired Trend.” Modern Healthcare. 2002. 
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theory supports indications from the IHSP report that for-profit and not-for-profit act 
differently when pricing services. 
The authors’ simulation found that hospitals mergers resulted in price increases of 
up to 58% in highly concentrated markets.  When examining the behavioral differences 
between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, the study showed similar responses to 
increases in market power.  In anti-trust cases involving not-for-profit hospitals, the 
hospital managers commonly defend the mergers by claiming that they will not increase 
prices since their mission is to serve the community.  The authors’ findings contradict 
that.  In comparing for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, the authors found that not-for-
profit hospitals have less elastic demand for their services, lower marginal costs, lower 
prices, and higher price markups.  In other words, the study found that the degree of 
market concentration is what leads to higher prices, not the for-profit status.  This 
analysis runs contrary to the data provided by the IHSP which found that for-profit 
hospitals charge much higher charge-to-cost ratios. 
In “Factors Associated with the Increasing Cost of Hospital Care” (1972),8 
Andersen and May present some basic, yet useful, ideas about the causes of rising 
hospital costs.  Their study looks at the two decades leading up to their paper in 1972, but 
the concepts they outline are still useful in understanding today’s economic environment 
for hospitals.  They discuss “use” and “price” as the two primary components that have 
caused hospital care costs to rise.  Use factors deal with the cost implication of hospitals 
offering more services.  Health care is one of the most rapidly evolving industries, and 
new procedures, medicine, and equipment are constantly being developed leading to 
                                                 
8
 Andersen, Ronald and J. Joel May. “Factors Associated with the Increasing Cost of Hospital Care.” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 399. 1972. 
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higher costs.  In addition, the sheer rise in population causes increases in hospital costs.  
Hospitals must serve greater volumes of patients each year simply due to increases in the 
numbers of people served in the area.  Andersen and May describe price factors as 
including “overall economic factors affecting the hospital, the nature of the care itself, 
and how efficiently or inefficiently it is given.”9  They use the Consumer Price Index as a 
measure of inflation in the economy as a whole, and they note, as I also noted above, that 
medical inflation has been a little higher than overall inflation.  They also note the rising 
wages and salaries of hospital employees as a contributing factor to rising costs.  Finally, 
the authors take note of the increasingly larger stock of plant and equipment necessary to 
fulfill hospital care needs and the rising prices of that plant and equipment.  The authors 
concluded that, overall, price factors accounted for 7/8th of the increases in costs.  In the 
most basic economic terms, the authors describe rising hospital costs in terms of quantity 
and price.  Their work is useful, however, when considering the structure of hospital 
costs. 
In “The structure of hospital costs: An econometric analysis of short term general 
hospitals in Maryland” (1992),10 Philip Kemere examines the hospital cost structure 
specifically in Maryland.  He “examines the effect of input price, output level, hospital 
location, teaching status, intensity of care, indigent care, utilization rates, and racial 
composition on hospital costs in Maryland.”11 The study uses time series data from 1981-
1985 for short term general hospitals.  Kemere also estimates economies of scale, 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. p. 14. 
10
 Kemere, Philip. “The structure of hospital costs: An econometric analysis of short term general hospitals 
in Maryland.” Howard University Dissertation. 1992. 
11
 Ibid. p. v. 
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economies of scope,12 the elasticities of demand for individual inputs, and elasticities of 
substitution of inputs.  With these estimates Kemere is able to make assessments about 
the ability of hospital managers to manage costs.  This can be done by either expanding 
or scaling down operations, or substituting towards less expensive inputs. 
 Kemere begins by laying down a framework with which to analyze the hospital 
market.  He reviews the different approaches that have been taken in past literature.  In 
this regard his work supplements the works previously mentioned in this paper.  The 
different approaches described by Kemere provide valuable insight as to the choice of the 
dependent variable in my econometric model.  The first approach is the profit 
maximization model.  In this approach, it is assumed that, given some efficient level of 
service provided, hospitals attempt to minimize total operating cost.  In addition, 
hospitals charge higher prices for services that are more price inelastic such as ancillary 
services.  This model appears to be unrealistic, however, since hospitals seem to have 
other goals than just profits.  Also, the approach does not account for the significant role 
that physicians play in hospital management.  The next approach is the quantity 
maximization model which aims to maximize the level of services that hospitals provide 
and the amount of care that they give to their community.  This theory fails in that it 
downplays the role of profits in hospital behavior.  The third approach analyzes hospitals 
under the assumption that they aim to maximize a utility function that depends on both 
quantity and quality of service provided.  Kemere notes that the “desire to increase 
quality leads to the over-employment of inputs beyond the profit maximization point.”13  
                                                 
12
 Economies of scope are said to exist if it is cheaper to produce two products jointly than it is to produce 
them separately. 
13
 Kemere, Philip. “The structure of hospital costs: An econometric analysis of short term general hospitals 
in Maryland.” Howard University Dissertation. 1992. p. 19. 
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Next is the physician income maximization model.  Hospital management is closely tied 
with its physicians and aims to maximize the income of the physicians.  In this model 
“non-physician inputs are hired up to the point where their marginal contribution to 
physician revenue is zero.”14  Finally, the “two firms in one organization model” divides 
hospitals into two different firms, one being the doctor firm and the other being the 
administrative firm.  In this model the doctor firm is concerned only with providing the 
services without heed to cost or price.  The administrative firm makes decisions about the 
marginal benefits of different services.  While there is no one model that is unanimously 
accepted or preferred, Kemere adheres most closely to the profit maximization model by 
assuming in his econometric model that hospitals aim to minimize operating costs. 
 Kemere then constructs his model using various variables.  The dependent 
variable is total operating costs which are the summation of various hospital operations 
and services that are provided.  The independent variables fall under three different 
categories.  He utilizes four different variables to measure the level of output.  These 
include outpatient visits, pediatric inpatients, adult inpatients, and geriatric inpatients.  
Next Kemere includes six input price variables, namely administrative, general duty 
nurse, ancillary, general service, drugs and medical supplies, and capital service.  Finally 
he includes six variables to control for varying hospital characteristics.  These variables 
include medical school affiliation, length of stay, urban/rural location, capacity 
utilization, CT scan, and indigent care. 
 Kemere’s results lead to a number of different conclusions.  All output levels and 
input price levels have positive relationships with total operating costs, which makes 
intuitive sense.  As output increases, total operating costs also increase.  Kemere’s results 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. p. 24. 
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indicate positive but almost negligible economies of scale.  According to his parameter 
estimates and calculations, a 1% increase in the four outputs leads to 0.983% increase in 
total operating cost.  Constant economies of scale cannot be rejected.  Kemere did find 
more economically significant economies of scales for different sized hospitals.  
Hospitals with less than 250 beds appear to experience economies of scale and beds with 
more than 500 beds appear to experience diseconomies of scale.  Small hospitals earned a 
scale coefficient of 1.21 while large hospitals received a scale coefficient of .86.  The 
model found the existence of economies of scope between outpatient visits and pediatric 
inpatients, as well as between adult inpatients and geriatric patients.15  Kemere also finds 
degrees of substitutability between certain inputs: administrative and nursing service, 
general service and materials, and general and capital services.  He also finds 
complementarity between nursing and general services, nursing and medical supplies, 
administrative and ancillary labor, and administrative and general service labor.16 
 
III Results: 
 III.i Qualitative: 
Maryland’s system provides an interesting case study for government hospital 
regulation.  Evaluating this system is useful in determining the merits of hospital 
                                                 
15
 Kemere employs a multiproduct cost function for his econometric model.  Kemere explains the 
calculation of economies of scope for this type of model.  It is done by taking the second derivative of total 
cost with respect to the two quantities of outputs in question and compares that value to zero.  If the value 
is less than zero, then economies of scope exist.  In chapter three of his dissertation, Kemere shows that this 
condition will hold if the coefficients of the two output variables in question and the coefficient of their 
cross-product sum to a negative value. 
16
 Kemere arrives at these conclusions about substitutability by calculating elasticities of substitution.  
These values come from the second derivative of the natural logarithm of cost with respect to the natural 
logarithm of the two price variables in question.  If the value is greater than 1 then the inputs are said to be 
substitutes.  If the value is less than zero then the inputs are said to be complements.  If the value is infinity 
then the inputs are perfect substitutes.  If the value equals zero then the inputs are perfect complements and 
must be used in fixed proportion. 
 16 
regulation and in making informed judgments about whether it should be extended to 
other states.  Among other states, Oregon has expressed interest in applying a similar 
system. 
As a group, Maryland’s hospitals have the lowest charge-to-cost markup ratio 
among the hospital population of the 50 US states, according to the previously noted 
IHSP report.17  As mentioned above, the national average charge-to-cost ratio in 2004 for 
the 4,222 hospitals in the IHSP report was 244%.  Maryland compares with a much lower 
markup ratio of 123% for the same year.  Since the implementation of its hospital 
regulation plan in 1974, Maryland’s hospital gross charges have gone from 25% above 
the US national average to 6% below.  Despite the high level of price regulation, 73.2% 
of Maryland hospitals reported positive net income, which is on par with the national 
average. 
The agency that monitors and regulates the Maryland hospital market is the 
Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC).  This government agency works 
alongside hospitals in the state to set the rates that they can charge.  The agency was 
established in 1971 when it underwent a three year “phase in period.”  It then began 
enforcing price regulation in 1974 by setting individual rate schedules for each hospital.  
Originally, the HSCRC’s jurisdiction only applied to non-federal payers of health care, 
meaning they did not set prices for Medicare or Medicaid.  However, in 1977 the state of 
Maryland was granted a waiver, the only one of its kind, which allowed the HSCRC to 
set the rate schedules for federal payers as well.  This is known as the “all payer system” 
and provides greater power to the HSCRC in its effort to ensure consistency and stability.  
                                                 
17
 Institute for Health and Socio-economic Policy. “The Third Annual IHSP Hospital 200: The Nation’s 
Most – and Least – Expensive Hospitals Fiscal Year 2003/ 2004.” 2005. 
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Unlike any other state, each payer in Maryland pays the same price whether it be 
Medicare, Medicaid, uncompensated care provision, private insurance, or a health 
maintenance organization (HMO).  According to Robert Murray, the Executive Director 
of the HSCRC, the system focuses on controlling costs, not necessarily limiting profit.  
Since the focus of this study is analyzing the minimization of total operating costs, 
Maryland’s system can be evaluated directly with the econometric model that is the 
product of my study.  Since 1976 Maryland has enjoyed the lowest rate of increase in 
costs, and as mentioned continues to produce profitable hospitals. 
The HSCRC has six main objectives: control cost growth, improve access to care, 
improve equity in payment and care, improve quality, provide financial stability, and 
increase transparency and accountability.  Murray does not believe that the health care 
market has the “characteristics of functional competition,”18 and thus the HSCRC aims to 
correct these failures with the aforementioned objectives in mind. 
The maintenance of hospital pricing is reviewed by analyzing the HSCRC’s 
Reasonableness of Charges report, or ROC.  Hospitals are placed in peer groups of 
similarly structured institutions in the state.  According to the HSCRC, “the purpose of 
these peer groups is to capture differences in rate structures across hospitals that cannot 
be accounted for directly by various adjustments to charges.”19  Hospitals are held 
accountable for what they can control, but it is recognized by the HSCRC that there are 
certain factors that are beyond their control.  For this reason before it compares hospitals 
within peer groups, the HSCRC makes adjustments to standardize the costs faced by 
                                                 
18
 Murray, Robert. “The Maryland All-Payor Hospital Rate Setting System.” Presentation for the Brazilian 
National Supplementary Health Agency. 2006. p. 13. 
19
 Health Services Cost Review Commission, “About the HSCRC.” Published on the Maryland state 
website. 2007. 
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individual hospitals.  These factors include adjustments for the differences in the labor 
market, direct medical education costs, trauma costs, case mix, disproportionate share, 
and partial differences in capital costs.  The labor market adjustor is included to control 
for differences in labor costs that are outside of the hospital’s control.  Factors like 
location might yield such differences in the labor market.  Parts of residents’ salaries are 
removed to standardize direct medical education costs.  There are incremental costs 
associated with operating trauma centers, thus an adjustment is made to standardize these 
differences.  The case mix adjustment is a key standardizing factor.  This takes into 
account the “average patient acuity across hospitals.”20  In other words, different 
hospitals, due to either location or other factors, will end up providing care for different 
types of patients with varying levels of health problems.  The HSCRC accounts for this 
by making an adjustment for average acuity.  This disproportionate share adjustment 
takes this concept one step further by accounting for hospitals that care for relatively 
higher levels of poor patients.  Poor patients may incur higher costs for things like getting 
them qualified for Medicaid or finding a place for them to go upon discharge.  The 
capital costs adjustment smoothes out differences among capital costs by taking half of 
the individual hospital’s capital costs and then half of the average capital costs within the 
peer group.  Once all of these adjustments have been made, the HSCRC continues with 
its analysis of the ROC and compare hospitals within their peer groups. 
With standardized peer groups, the HSCRC makes evaluations on which hospitals 
need to adjust their pricing rates.  If hospitals charge a price markup that is more than 3% 
above the average for the peer group, then the HSCRC will enter into discussions with 
that hospital.  This hospital will then usually target the peer group average as a goal on a 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. p. 5. 
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case by case basis.  The system keeps hospitals in check and promotes beneficial 
competition among them.  The HSCRC also pays attention to certain benchmarks, one of 
which is operating margin.  Though a specific operating margin is not mandated, they do 
use a benchmark operating margin of 2.75%.21  (Publicly traded, for-profit hospitals can 
provide some contrast since these firms are generally the system affiliated type of 
hospital as described in the IHSP report, and financial information is easily accessible 
since they must file their income statements.  According to Yahoo! Finance, the average 
operating margin for the industry is 7.00%, well above the 2.75% set by Maryland.)  
However, in an interview with Mr. Murray, he stressed the fact that this is only a 
benchmark and is not aimed to reduce profits.  Traditionally, the average profit margins 
for Maryland hospitals have been about .5%-1.5% lower than the US national average 
across all hospitals,22 but higher profit rates are not prohibited.  According to Mr. Murray, 
“profits are a reward for being efficient under our system just as they are in a competitive 
market.”23 
The transparency and accountability aims of the HSCRC also promote beneficial 
competition.  The Maryland Health Care Commission works in partnership with the 
HSCRC and releases a hospital pricing guide periodically.  The guide lists prices at 
individual hospitals for common health care needs like newborn delivery, pneumonia, 
chest pain, and heart failure.  One of the major factors that causes problems in the 
hospital care market is the lack of price transparency.  It seems that physical proximity to 
a hospital is often more important than the prices of the services (Gaynor and Vogt 
                                                 
21
 Phone interview with Robert Murray of the HSCRC. March 15, 2008. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
 20 
2003).24  Since the majority of consumers of hospital care pay only a fraction of the price 
charged by hospitals, not much attention is paid to hospital pricing.  This can be 
detrimental to price competition.  If promoted and then utilized by consumers, programs 
like Maryland’s hospital pricing guide can encourage more price transparency in a sector 
that appears to be lacking it. 
As mentioned above,25 price markup restrictions have led to the lowest markup 
ratio in the country, and Maryland has had the lowest rate of increase in hospital costs 
since 1976.  The HSCRC has achieved other beneficial results as well.  Because cost and 
pricing structures are evaluated on a case by case basis, the Maryland system eliminates 
the ability to shift costs.  In other words, hospitals in other states might shift the burdens 
of the cost of expensive and unprofitable services like emergency care into other areas of 
operation, usually ancillary services. In effect they attempt to make up what they lose in 
one service by charging more for another.  The HSCRC eliminates this problem.  
Maryland’s health care sector also enjoys the greatest level of stability in the country.  
Though stability is not a readily quantifiable objective, hospital bond ratings provide an 
effective approximation.  With the highest rated bonds in the country, it can be said that 
the Maryland health care sector is the most stable by state in the US.  In addition, the 
payment structure is the most equitable in the country.  In Maryland, the uninsured pay 
the same price as the insurance companies that cover the insured which makes sense in an 
economic as well as ethical framework.  They have also achieved a system that does not 
allow for patient dumping.  Oftentimes hospitals will attempt to transfer costly patients 
with low revenues to other hospitals, usually a non-profit institution.  This practice is not 
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 Gaynor, Martin and William B. Vogt. “Competition Among Hospitals”. RAND Journal of Economics. 
Winter 2003. p. 2. 
25
 p. 12. 
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allowed in Maryland.  Finally, Maryland hospitals have a reputation for clinical 
excellence, but this is also where problems with the Maryland plan seep in. 
The greatest weakness with a hospital regulation system like Maryland’s is that 
there is little incentive for quality improvement.  Hospitals must operate in such a way 
that they are always searching for cost cutting opportunities.  This creates an environment 
in which there is little incentive to actively seek ways to offer higher quality care which 
might be more costly.  In most industries, sacrificing a certain amount of quality in order 
to cut costs is not much of an issue, but in the case of health care the implications of 
lower quality care are much greater since they affect the health of the patients.  In 
addition, hospital profits are extremely important for the progression of health care.  For a 
non-profit hospital, all profits that are generated get poured back into the health care 
services.  In many cases this reinvestment will be in the form of research and 
development.  Maryland hospitals might be more reluctant to engage in research and 
development since they seek to keep costs down.   
The HSCRC recognizes this potential problem, and it seeks to correct it.  Quality 
based reimbursement, or pay for performance (P4P), has gained steam nationally, and 
Maryland is undergoing its own Quality Initiative that would provide financial incentives 
for high quality care.  The program focuses on quality measurement and appropriate 
incentives to follow.  An Evaluation Work Group exists that conducts periodic 
assessments of the effectiveness of the system and whether quality targets are being met.  
The HSCRC claims that the Quality Initiative “will represent one of the broadest quality-
based reimbursement systems in the nation.”26  As a side note, for similar reasons that 
                                                 
26
 Health Services Cost Review Commission, “About the HSCRC.” Published on the Maryland state 
website. 2007. 
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preventive care reduces long term costs of healthcare, higher quality care does the same 
by reducing costs of error corrections and other complications, thus higher quality care 
can in fact reduce hospital costs. 
III.ii Quantitative: 
My econometric model used data from 110 hospitals: 45 hospitals from Maryland 
and 55 hospitals from Virginia.  The selection of hospitals will be described in further 
detail below in the description of the data. 
The dependent variable used in the econometric model is total operating costs per 
hospital bed.  This was chosen as the dependent variable for two reasons. First, 
minimizing hospital cost is one of the foremost goals of the HSCRC.  The goal of the 
model is to determine whether or not the HSCRC has an effect on minimizing hospital 
costs.  Second, the profit maximizing model for hospitals, while not comprehensive in 
describing hospital behavior, is probably the most applicable.  This approach will help in 
determining whether or not the less regulated hospitals in Virginia behave in the same 
way as the highly regulated hospitals in Maryland.  The dependent variable was 
originally just total operating costs, but because of problems with heteroskedasticity27 I 
divided operating costs by number of hospital beds in order to transform the variable into 
a ratio.28  Once this transformation was made, the model was indeed homoskedastic. The 
dependent variable was also logged due to the high magnitude and wide range of its 
values.  The logged values provide for a more convenient interpretation of the parameter 
estimates. 
                                                 
27
 Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance alters across different segments of the sample population.  
Since the standard error is used to calculate t-statistics, it makes the values of the t-statistics inaccurate. 
28
 Using ratios rather than a unit based dependent variable such as dollars is a technique commonly used in 
order to combat heteroskedasticity. 
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 On the right side of the equation the independent variables begin with pediatric 
discharges.  This is defined as the volume of discharges for patients age 15 and younger.  
Next is adult discharges which is defined as the volume of discharges for patients 
between the ages of 15 and 65.  Next is geriatric discharges which is defined as the 
volume of discharges for patients age 65 and older.  Geriatric discharges was followed 
with the inclusion of outpatient visits. The next variable included is emergency room 
admissions.  ER admissions is followed by a proxy variable for time spent in open heart 
surgery.  This is calculated by summing the volume of discharges from four different 
Medicare Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG).  This includes DRGs 104-107, namely 
cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedures with cardiac catheterization, 
cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedures without cardiac catheterization, 
coronary bypass with percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty, and coronary 
bypass with cardiac catheterization.  Pediatric, adult, and geriatric discharges, outpatient 
visits, ER admissions, and time spent in open heart surgery parallel the output variables 
included in Kemere’s model and provide a rough approximation for the level of output of 
the hospitals. 
 The average hourly wages for administrative and general employees as well as 
average hourly wages for nursing administration workers were included next.  These 
variables were incorporated into the model in order gauge differences in labor costs 
across the states.29  The values were transformed into logarithms so that they could be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
                                                 
29
 A number of input price variables were not included because of insufficient data.  Drug and medical 
supplies costs were included in the HCRIS report, but there were minimal observations.  Nursing 
administration salaries were used instead of general duty nurse salaries due to problems in locating data on 
those salaries. 
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 Seven variables were included as control variables.  First was a variable for 
capacity utilization.  This was calculated by dividing total inpatient days by total bed 
days available in the hospital.  Total bed days available was calculated by multiplying the 
number of beds in the hospital by 365 days.  The second variable included was average 
length of stay.  This value was calculated by dividing total inpatient days by total 
inpatient discharges.  This variable was included in order to account for differences in 
costs that would result from shorter or longer hospital stays.  Next was a dummy variable 
for location.  This was included to catch differences in costs that might result from being 
located in an urban or rural area.  Observations received a zero-value if located in a rural 
area and a one-value if located in an urban area.  The third control variable was a dummy 
variable for type of hospital.  For-profit (investor owned) hospitals received a one-value.  
Not-for-profit and government hospitals received a zero-value.  This variable was 
included for two reasons.  One was to control for differences in how different hospitals 
might behave.  Second was to observe if different types of hospitals do in fact behave 
differently as suggested by Newhouse (1970) and others.  Two additional variables were 
included for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines and computed tomography 
scanners (CT scan).  Hospitals received one-values if they operate MRIs or CT scans and 
zero-values if they do not.  These variables were included because the equipment is 
costly to operate, and its present would be expected to have a substantial impact on the 
dependent variable.  In addition they act as proxy variables for overall level of 
technology at the hospital.  The log of total hospital beds was included as the seventh 
control variable.  This means that the log of total hospital beds appears on both sides of 
the equation: a scale factor as part of the dependent variable and also as an explanatory 
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factor.  This should not make the econometric invalid, however.  The independent 
variable includes total operating costs which are related to both short run expenses and 
capital stock.  Hospital beds is essentially a measure of capital stock which cannot be 
altered in the short run.  This makes hospital beds an effective scale factor. 
 My hope in constructing my regression was that the aforementioned independent 
variables would sufficiently capture the structure of total operating costs.  I then added a 
dummy variable for state.  This was introduced in order to determine whether differences 
exist between states that are not captured by the other variables included.  Hospitals 
receive a zero-value if they are located in Maryland and a one-value if they are located in 
Virginia.  Assuming that the other variables sufficiently control for other factors that 
affect total operating cost, then a positive, significant parameter estimate would indicate 
that the Maryland regulation system makes a beneficial difference. 
 Data was compiled from three different sources.  I began with a dataset 163 
hospitals from Maryland and Virginia from the 2005 Healthcare Cost Report Information 
System (HRCIS).  State Level Patient Data was then added to the dataset.  Forty-two 
observations were dropped from the original HCRIS dataset since data on these hospitals 
was not available in the second dataset.  I then added data from the 2005 American 
Hospital Association (AHA) guide.  This led to an additional 11 hospitals being dropped 
from the dataset since data was not available for these hospitals in the AHA guide.  This 
limited the dataset to a final number of 110 hospitals of which 55 are located in Virginia 
and 45 are located in Maryland.  Total operating costs, administrative and general 
salaries, nursing administrative salaries, capacity utilization, length of stay, total hospital 
beds, and urban dummy were taken from the HCRIS dataset.  Pediatric discharges, adult 
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discharges, geriatric discharges, ER admissions, and time spent in open heart surgery 
were taken from State Level Patient Data.  Outpatient visits, for-profit dummy, MRI 
dummy, CT scan dummy, and state dummy were taken from the AHA guide. 
The table below provides the results from the regression that was run.  The last 
two columns represent the confidence levels for the different variables.  A check in the 
5% column indicates that a variable is significant on a 95% confidence level.  A check in 
the 10% column indicates that the variable is significant on a 90% confidence level.  The 
parameter estimates are discussed in further detail below. 
Table of results: 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-stat <5% <10% 
Pediatric discharges 0.0000289 0.0001205 0.24   
Adult discharges 0.0000782 0.0000221 3.54 x  
Geriatric discharges 0.0000332 0.0000333 1.00   
ER admissions 0.0000259 0.0000286 0.91   
Outpatient visits 0.00000065 0.00000031 2.07 x  
Heart surgery 0.0001516 0.0003124 0.49   
Log Administrator wage 0.464293 0.1365512 3.4 x  
Log Nursing administrator 
wage 0.0537828 0.1627619 0.33   
Urban dummy 0.1055244 0.0892099 1.18   
Capactiy utilization 1.001368 0.2460917 4.07 x  
Length of stay -0.0111654 0.0314404 -0.36   
For profit dummy -0.2780159 0.1026161 -2.71 x  
CT scan dummy -0.0292982 0.2421292 -0.12   
MRI dummy 0.1537607 0.0869766 1.77  x 
Log beds -0.8805097 0.0361762 -24.34 x  
State dummy 0.1239822 0.0875153 1.42   
Constant 14.58412 0.6729549 21.67 x  
Adjusted R-squared 0.8942     
 
The model created was highly descriptive of total operating costs per bed with an 
adjusted R-squared of .8793.  Since the dependent variable was logged, independent 
variable parameter estimates will be interpreted as approximate percentage changes in 
total operating costs per bed.  The first variable was total pediatric discharges.  Its 
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coefficient was .0000289 indicating that an increase of 1,000 pediatric discharges would 
lead to a 2.89% increase in total operating costs per bed.  It had a t-statistic of 0.24, 
making it statistically insignificant on its own on a 95% confidence level.  Total adult 
discharges had a coefficient of .0000782 meaning that an increase of 1,000 adult 
discharges would lead to a 7.82% increase in total operating costs per bed.  This variable 
had a t-statistic of 3.54, making it statistically significant on a 95% confidence level.  
Total geriatric charges had a coefficient of .0000332 which signifies that an increase of 
1,000 geriatric discharges would lead to a 3.32% increase in total operating costs per bed.  
This variable proved statistically insignificant on its own with a t-statistic of 1.00.  
Emergency room admissions had a coefficient of .0000259 indicating that an increase of 
1,000 ER admissions would result in a 2.59% increase in total operating costs per bed.  
This variable was statistically insignificant on its own with a t-statistic of 0.91.  Next was 
the proxy variable for time spent in open heart surgery.  This variable had a parameter 
estimate of .0001516, meaning that an increase of 1,000 heart surgery discharges would 
result in a 15.2% increase in total operating costs per bed.  This variable had a t-statistic 
of only 0.49 making it statistically insignificant on its own.  Outpatient visits was the 
final output level variable included in the model.  This variable had a coefficient of 
.000000647, signifying that a 1,000 value increase in outpatient visits would lead to 
.0647% increase in total operating costs per bed.  This variable had a t-statistic of 2.07, 
also making it statistically significant on a 95% confidence level. 
Of these six output level variables, only adult discharges and outpatient visits 
were statistically significant on their own on a 95% confidence level.  These six variables 
were an important part of the model, however, so I examined them further.  I performed 
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an f-test to test their joint significance.  These variables were in fact found to be jointly 
significant, even though four of them were singularly insignificant. 
The next variables included were the input price variables for administrative and 
general wages and nursing administrative wages.  Since both the dependent and 
independent variables are in logarithmic form, these estimates are interpreted as 
elasticities.  The log of administrative and general wages had a coefficient of .4643 
indicating that a 10% increase in administrative salaries would lead to a 4.64% increase 
in total operating costs per bed.  This variable had a t-statistic of 3.40 making it 
statistically significant.  The log of nursing administration wages had a parameter 
estimate of .0538, meaning that a 10% increase in nursing administration wages would 
lead to a 0.54% increase in total operating costs per bed.  This variable had a t-statistic of 
only 0.33, making it statistically insignificant. 
As mentioned, various control variables were included next.  The first is capacity 
utilization which had a parameter estimate of 1.001.  Since this variable is a percentage it 
has a slightly different interpretation.  According to the parameter estimate given, a 1 
percentage point increase in capacity utilization (i.e. from 50% utilization to 51% 
utilization) results in a 1.001% increase in total operating costs per bed.  This variable 
had a t-statistic of 4.07, making it statistically significant.  This was followed by the 
dummy variable for location.  The coefficient for this variable was .1055 indicating that, 
all else equal, urban hospitals incurred total operating costs per bed that were about 
10.55% higher than hospitals located in rural areas.  The t-statistic of 1.18 made this 
variable statistically insignificant.  Next was the for-profit dummy variable.  The 
parameter estimate for this variable was -.2780 meaning that, all else equal, for-profit 
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hospitals’ total operating costs per bed were about 28% lower than those of not-for-profit 
or government hospitals.  This dummy variable had a t-statistic of -2.71 making it 
statistically significant.  The next control variable included was the average length of 
stay.  This variable had a parameter estimate of -.0112 indicating that a ten day increase 
in the average length of stay reduces total operating costs per bed by .11%.  Next, dummy 
variables were included for whether or not the hospitals operate CT scans and/or MRI’s.  
The dummy variable for CT scan had a parameter estimate of -.0293 which means that, 
all else equal, total operating costs per bed were about 3% less for hospitals that operate 
CT scans.  This variable had a t-statistic of -0.12 making it statistically insignificant.  The 
MRI dummy variable had a coefficient of 0.1538 indicating that total operating costs per 
bed were about 15.4% higher for hospitals that operate MRI’s, all else equal.  This 
variable was statistically significant on a 90% confidence level with a t-statistic of 1.77. 
Next, the log of hospital beds was included.  This variable had a coefficient of -
0.8805.  Since hospital beds appears both on the left hand side of the equation as a scale 
factor and as an explanatory variable on the right hand side, some simple algebra is 
necessary in order to calculate the appropriate coefficient.  I added the log of hospital 
beds to both sides which eliminates it from the left hand side.  Combining the two 
coefficients on log of hospital beds on the right hand side, those values being 1 and  
-0.8805, the parameter estimate becomes .1195.  Once again since both the dependent 
and independent variables are logs, this value is interpreted as an elasticity.  Thus a 10% 
increase in the number of hospital beds leads to a 1.2% increase in total operating costs.  
This variable was statistically significant. 
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Finally, the dummy variable for state was included.  State had a coefficient of 
.0971, indicating that, all else equal, hospitals in Virginia incurred total operating costs 
per bed that were about 9.7% higher than the total operating costs per bed for hospitals in 
Maryland.  This variable had a t-statistic of 1.18, making it statistically insignificant on a 
95% confidence level.  This variable was kept in the model in the interest of examination 
and discussion moving forward. 
 
IV. Conclusions: 
With an adjusted R-squared of .8492, the econometric model created appears to 
be highly descriptive of the structure of total operating costs.  Within this model, the 
purpose of this study was to determine whether or not the Maryland regulation system 
has an impact on reducing hospital operating costs since this is one of its main objectives.  
This is approximated in the model by interpreting the estimates on the dummy variable 
for state, be it Maryland or Virginia.  This main objective of this thesis will be addressed 
in detail momentarily, but first will be analysis of other pertinent conclusions from the 
data. 
Four of the six output variables (pediatric, adult, geriatric, time spent in open 
heart surgery, ER admissions, and outpatient visits) were statistically insignificant on 
their own.  Only adult discharges and outpatient visits were statistically significant on 
their own on the 95% confidence level.  The six variables were, however, proven jointly 
significant.  Some of these variables had negative parameter estimates in earlier 
regressions that I ran during this study which did not make economic sense.  Other 
studies such as “Hospital Efficiency and Indigent Care” (Campbell 1990) ran into similar 
 31 
problems.  In the final regression I settled on for this study, all output variables behaved 
according to my a priori hypotheses, i.e. that as each output variable increases, total 
operating costs also increases.  Hopefully this is an indication that the final model is an 
effective one. 
The location variable for urban versus rural yielded some interesting results.  
Urban hospitals were found to be 10.6% more costly than rural hospitals, all else equal.  
The exact reason for this result is unclear, but it could possibly result from the 
populations that surround these hospitals.  For instance, urban environments probably 
have higher rates of violence which leads to a greater volume of complex hospital care.  
In addition, disease might spread faster in a highly populated, urban area.  Another 
possibility is that the wages of employees that were not included in this model might be 
higher in urban areas.  The availability and use of more expansive datasets could 
potentially shed more light on this issue. 
One parameter estimate that did not seem to make much economic sense was the 
dummy variable for CT scan.  The interpretation of this variable said that on average, 
hospitals with CT scans incurred 3% lower operating costs than those without, all else 
equal.  CT scans are costly to operate, thus it would seem that operating CT scans should 
have a positive effect on operating costs, not a negative one.  Perhaps operating CT scans 
is indicative of more sophisticated hospitals that operate more efficiently.  In any case, 
the variable was highly insignificant with a t-statistic of only -0.12.  The MRI variable 
behaved more according to my intuition.  The variable had a positive impact on total 
operating costs per bed. 
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The behavior of for-profit versus not-for-profit hospitals was of particular interest 
of this study.  The regression found that on average, for-profit hospitals incurred total 
operating costs that were about 28% less than that of not-for-profit hospitals, all else 
equal.  My initial hypothesis was that the two types of hospitals would either be about 
equivalent in behavior, or that for-profit hospitals would incur lower costs.  The logic is 
as follows.  A sensible explanation arises from examining hospital behavior with the 
assumption of profit maximization.  Under this assumption both for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals aim to minimize costs and then charge a price that is higher than that cost.  
In this instance, both types of hospitals would behave in essentially the same way.  
However, not-for-profit hospitals might have alternative objectives as well, as noted in 
Kemere and others.  This might include maximizing the quantity of care provided to the 
community.  This might lead to providing a higher level of uncompensated care.  It could 
also result in the overutilization of inputs beyond the point of efficiency as mentioned by 
Kemere and others. 
A main objective of the Health Services Cost Review Commission of Maryland is 
to reduce hospital costs.  According to the regression, the total operating costs per bed for 
hospitals in Maryland were approximately 10% less than that for Virginia hospitals.  This 
would be a strong indicator that the HSCRC has a positive impact on reducing hospital 
costs as long as there are not other factors that make Maryland and Virginia hospitals 
different.  With a t-statistic of only 1.18, however, the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
is equal to zero cannot be rejected on a 95% confidence level.  This means that, according 
to the regression that was run, it is possible that the Maryland regulation system has no 
impact on reducing hospital costs, but it is still more likely that it does. 
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Having no impact on reducing costs could be easily explained.  First of all, if the 
assumption is made that hospitals in Maryland and Virginia are both profit maximizing 
institutions, then hospitals in both states would aim to minimize their costs and then 
charge a price higher than that minimized cost in order to attain a profit.  This follows the 
same logic as was presented for for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  In this case, 
hospitals in both states take the necessary steps in order to minimize cost.  Hospitals 
would not need a regulatory agency to encourage the minimization of costs because that 
is already the objective of the institutions.  An efficient, properly functioning hospital 
would be able to make sound economic decisions about the cost structure of their 
services.  Especially once for-profit versus not-for-profit has been controlled for, the 
profit maximization assumption would lead one to believe that hospitals in Maryland and 
Virginia would behave in the exact same way with respect to cost. 
Another factor that would encourage similar behavior in both states is the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS).  Implemented in 1983, this system sets the 
reimbursement schedules for hospitals for patients that qualify for Medicare.  Each 
Medicare patient is classified in a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) based on clinical 
information.  Medicare calculates the average cost for providing each service.  Hospitals 
are then reimbursed the mean cost of each DRG by Medicare.  Hospitals that are able to 
provide the service below the average cost of the DRG are able to earn a profit.  Those 
that cannot provide the service at mean cost are forced to absorb the loss.  Hospitals 
therefore seek to provide each hospital service at or below the DRG average cost.  This 
system is beneficial, first of all, because it encourages competition among hospitals.  
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Hospitals that operate efficiently are rewarded with profits.  Hospitals that do not operate 
efficiently are penalized and forced to find ways to work more properly. 
This system is also important in the context of this analysis.  The Medicare PPS 
encourages, or one could even say forces, hospitals to minimize costs for Medicare 
services if they are to be successful.  If hospitals are able to provide a service at a lower 
cost for Medicare patients, then clearly they will follow the same steps to minimize costs 
in providing the same services to other patients since it will increase their profits.  Even 
though Virginia lacks an agency like the HSCRC of Maryland, the Medicare Prospective 
Payment System acts in a similar way to make sure that hospitals minimize costs.  If this 
is indeed the case, then one would expect that the state variable in the regression would 
be insignificant.  The regression that was run for this study was inconclusive.  The 
coefficient indicated that the HSCRC has a positive impact on minimizing costs, but the 
null hypothesis that the system does not affect hospital cost structure could not be 
rejected. 
While the HSCRC states that the regulation system is about minimizing costs, not 
necessarily limiting profits, there are merits to the system with respect to reducing prices.  
Maryland does have the lowest price markup on hospital services in the country.  It 
would be difficult to argue that the HSCRC does not have a substantial impact on that 
fact.  Judging by the information provided in the qualitative results section of this study, 
the Maryland regulation system succeeds in making health care more affordable and 
accessible to its citizens.  Maryland has the most equitable system in the country since all 
payers, Medicare and privately insured patients included, are charged the same price for 
the same service.  In addition, the fact that Maryland has the most stable hospital sector in 
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the country, judging by hospital bond ratings, should not be overlooked.  Whether or not 
this results directly from the regulation system is debatable, however it would seem likely 
that the HSCRC has at least some positive effect on hospital market stability in 
Maryland. Even if one rejects that Maryland’s system aids in reducing hospitals’ costs, it 
is difficult to refute that the system does not yield substantial benefits for patients. 
With so many issues affecting the US health care system, it seems that 
government regulation is necessary in order make the hospital market operate more 
efficiently and equitably.  Perhaps a similar system could benefit other states like New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California that have the highest charge-to-cost markups in the 
country.  An agency like the HSCRC could help make health care more affordable and 
accessible in these and other states.  Under Governor Mitt Romney, Massachusetts 
recently passed legislation that effectively forces all of its citizens to insure themselves.  
Those who do not purchase health insurance must pay penalties.  One of the criticisms of 
the legislation is that there is no regulation in place to control health care costs.  Citizens 
are forced to purchase health insurance, but insurance may become more and more costly 
without any controls in place.  A system like Maryland’s could provide a solution for 
Massachusetts as well. 
The Maryland system certainly does not solve all of the problems that plague the 
US health care system; however, in my opinion, the benefits of the system are many.  
Implementing the system in other states could be the first step towards making the US 
health care system operate more effectively and equitably. 
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